THE EFFECT OF A CRIME\u27S CONSEQUENCES ON VERDICT:  TYPE II ERRORS AND INFORMATION DISTORTION by PERLMAN, BRIAN JAY
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Doctoral Dissertations Student Scholarship
Fall 1979
THE EFFECT OF A CRIME'S




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more
information, please contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
PERLMAN, BRIAN JAY, "THE EFFECT OF A CRIME'S CONSEQUENCES ON VERDICT: TYPE II ERRORS AND
INFORMATION DISTORTION" (1979). Doctoral Dissertations. 1239.
https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation/1239
INFORMATION TO USERS
This was produced from  a copy of a docum ent sent to  us for microfilming. While the 
m ost advanced technological means to  photograph and reproduce this docum ent 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material 
subm itted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.
1. The sign or “ target”  for pages apparently lacking from the docum ent 
photographed is “Missing Page(s)” . If it was possible to  obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating 
adjacent pages to assure you of com plete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black m ark it is an 
indication tha t the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of 
movem ent during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we m eant to delete 
copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photo­
graphed the photographer has followed a definite m ethod in “sectioning” 
the material. I t is custom ary to  begin filming at the upper left hand corner 
o f a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with 
small overlaps. If  necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning 
below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by 
xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and 
tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to  our 
Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any docum ent m ay have indistinct print. In all cases we 




300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 
18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1 R 4EJ, ENGLAND
8009670
P e r l m a n , B r i a n  Ja y
THE EFFECT O F A CRIME’S CONSEQUENCES ON VERDICT: TYPE II 
ERRORS AND INFORMATION DISTORTION
University o f New Hampshire Ph.D. 1979
University 
Microfilms
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 18 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4EJ, England
Copyright 1980 
by 
Perlman, Brian Jay 
All Rights Reserved
THE EFFECT OF A CRIME'S CONSEQUENCES ON VERDICT 
TYPE II ERRORS AND INFORMATION DISTORTION
BY
BRIAN JAY PERLMAN 
B.A., SUNY at Stony Brook, 1974 
M.A., University of New Hampshire, 1977
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the University of New Hampshire 
in Partial Fulfillment of 
the Requirements for the Degree of




This thesis has been examined and approved.
Thesis director, Daniel C. Williams 
Associate Professor of Psychology
R. Michael Latta, Assistant Professor of Psychology
Lance K. Canon, Associate Professor of Psychology
/
Susan White, Associate Professor of Political Science
\ 1 Y \




I would like to thank the following people for their 
contributions:
Dr. Daniel C. Williams for the time and effort he 
devoted in his role as my dissertation chairperson. The 
emergence of the finished product was facilitated greatly 
by having someone listen to and comment on my ideas as they 
evolved.
Dr. R. Michael Latta, Dr. Lance K. Canon, Dr. Susan 
White, and Dr. Robert Craig for reviewing the manuscript 
at various points in its development. Their diverse exper­
tise contributed to its quality.
Suzanne Dimmit for the time she spent in preparation 
of the manuscript. Her efforts greatly lightened the burden 
of completing a doctoral thesis.
Dina Anselmi, whose caring and sharing made the task 
more pleasant.
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Harry 
and Anita Perlman. The achievement of my Ph.D. has been 




LIST OF T A B L E S ..................................  vi
LIST OF F I G U R E S ................................  vii
LIST OF APPENDICES.................................viii
ABSTRACT  ..................................... ix
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 1
II. M E T H O D ...........................................  15
J u r o r s ....................................... 15
D e s i g n ....................................... 15
Stimulus Material ............................  15
Dependent Measures .......................... 18
Manipulation checks .....................  18
V e r d i c t ..................................  19
Emotional reactions toward
the d e f e n d a n t .......................... 19
Reactions to the c r i m e ...................  20
Jurors' self-report data .................  20
Procedure..................................... 20
III. R E S U L T S .........................................  22
General Description .......................... 22
Manipulation Checks .......................... 24
Verdict Measures ............................  25
Emotional Reactions toward
the Defendant..............................  27
Reactions to the C r i m e .....................  30
Juror Self-report D a t a .....................  30
Ancillary Analyses .......................... 35
Correlations between variables ........... 35





1. Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Verdict
Measures as a Function of Crime Severity,
Juror Gender and Nature of Testimony......... 26
2. Multivariate and Univariate Tests for
Significance for Crime Severity and 
Eyewitness Testimony Effects on
Verdict Measures ..............................  28
3. Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Emotional
Reactions Toward the Defendant Measures as 
a Function of Crime Severity, Juror Gender 
and Nature of T e s t i m o n y ...................... 29
4. Multivariate and Univariate Tests of
Significance for Crime Severity Effects on 
Emotional Reactions Toward the
Defendant Measures ............................  31
5. Cell Means and Standard Deviations for
Reactions to the Crime Measures (Type II 
errors) as a Function of Crime Severity,
Juror Gender and Nature of Testimony......... 32
6. Multivariate and Univariate Tests of
Significance for Crime Severity Effects
on Reactions to the Crime Measures........... 33
7. Within Cell Correlations Between Variables
Comparing Severe and Mild Crime Conditions . . 36
8. Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings for All Data,
Severe Crime Condition Data, and Mild
Crime Condition D a t a ..........   39
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Tests of Regression Paths for All Data,
Severe Crime Condition Data, and Mild
Crime Condition D a t a .......................... 41
2. Tests of Regression Paths for Acquitting
and Convicting Jurors in the Severe
Crime C o n d i t i o n ..............................  45
vii
LIST OF APPENDICES
IA. Case Stimuli for Severe Crime,
Incriminating Evidence Condition ............. 58
IB. Mild Condition Manipulation ...................... 66
IC. Nonincriminating Eyewitness Testimony
Manipulation ..................................  69
ID. Nonincriminating Location Manipulation .........  71
2 . Dependent M e a s u r e s ..........................  72
viii
ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF A CRIME'S CONSEQUENCES ON VERDICT:
TYPE II ERRORS AND INFORMATION DISTORTION
by
BRIAN JAY PERLMAN 
University of New Hampshire, September, 1979
An understanding of our justice system can be enhanced 
through knowledge of how judges and jurors process courtroom 
information to arrive at their decisions. In the area of 
juror decision making, several psychological models have been 
suggested. Kaplan and Kemmerick (1975) and Ostrom, Werner 
and Saks (1978), for example, claim that verdicts can be 
predicted by combining the subjective weightings given to 
various pieces of trial information. Landy and Aronson (1969) 
posit that affect laden factors influence courtroom outcomes.
The present research attempts to extend the work of 
Vidmar (1972) and Kerr (1978) in utilizing a Type I-Type II 
error approach to juror decision making. A Type I error is 
defined here as convicting an innocent defendant while a 
Type II error is defined as acquitting a guilty one. Jurors 
concerned more with avoiding a Type I error are predicted to 
process information in a way favorable to the defendant and 
be more acquittal oriented, while those more concerned with
avoiding a Type II error are expected to process information 
in a way unfavorable to the defendant and be more conviction 
oriented. Various factors may affect a juror's Type I-Type 
II error orientation; the nature of the crime, characteris­
tics of the defendant or characteristics of the victim.
This study attempted to vary jurors' Type II error 
orientation by manipulating the severity of crime consequences. 
One hundred and forty-four mock jurors were presented one of 
two versions of a simulated, written courtroom case. In one 
condition, transcripts described an auto theft (mild crime 
condition) while in the other they described an auto theft- 
hit and run case (severe crime condition). The auto theft- 
hit and run crime incorporated the auto theft crime. In the 
act of stealing the car, the perpetrator ran over a mother 
and her daughter, killing the mother and paralyzing the 
daughter from the waist down. All other details about the 
crime and all courtroom testimony were highly similar across 
conditions. Thus, while the auto theft-hit and run crime 
carried a harsher penalty, there was little objective reason 
to find the defendant guiltier in this, condition. The crime 
severity factor was crossed with two evidence manipulations 
and with gender of juror (i.e., sex of subjects).
Two types of findings were reported; hypothesis test­
ing and model testing results. The hypothesis of the experi­
ment was that jurors in the severe crime condition would 
report the Type II error as having been higher, distort informa­
tion in a way unfavorable to the defendant and be more guilt
x
oriented. (They rendered verdicts of greater guilt, found 
the defendant to be more guilty and to be more likely to 
have committed the crime.) Results were highly consistent 
with these predictions. Jurors' responses to "reactions to 
the crime" measures showed that jurors did react more nega­
tively to the more severe crime, an indirect indication of a 
higher Type II error orientation. Information distortion in 
the predicted direction was indicated by jurors' assessments 
of their emotional reactions toward the defendant and some­
what by their self reported reasons for their verdict. Both 
were more unfavorable toward the defendant in the severe 
crime condition. Most importantly, jurors in the severe 
crime condition were clearly more guilt oriented on all three 
measures of verdict. In fact, crime severity had stronger 
effects than manipulations of actual evidence.
Model testing was attempted with examination of correla­
tion matrices and regression path coefficients. There was 
tentative support for the predicted model. Emotional reactions 
toward the defendant seemed to mediate the relationship between 
Type II errors and verdict.
Results suggest that a Type I-Type II error model may 
provide a useful description of some important juror decision 
making processes. It appears likely that further research can 
build upon these findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
American legal principle requires that a verdict be 
based upon objective consideration of admissible evidence. 
However, juridic decision making is a human process full of 
subjectivity. The adversarial nature of the courtroom allows 
two sided interpretation of trial information and provides 
jurors freedom to weigh the importance of each piece of evi­
dence. Because of the latitude afforded jurors, legal out­
comes are not only affected by evidence but also by the way 
in which evidence is processed.
Psychological research has focused on the subjective 
nature of the juridic process by examining the effects of 
extralegal factors (any factor affecting verdict besides ad­
missible evidence) on the evidence-verdict relationship 
(Gerbasi, Zuckerman and Reis, 1977). Studies have shown that 
mock jurors are influenced by such extralegal factors as the 
defendant's character (Landy and Aronson, 1969; Nemeth and 
Sosis, 1973; Sigall and Landy, 1972),.attractiveness (Efran, 
1974; Kalven and Zeisal, 1966; Sigall and Ostrove, 1975) , 
social economic status and gender (Gleason and Harris, 1976), 
the source of the defendant's character description (Dowdle, 
Gillen and Miller, 1974), the sentence facing convicted 
defendants (Kaplan and Simon, 1972; Kerr, 1978; McComas and 
Noll, 1974; Vidmar, 1972) and pretrial publicity (Hoiberg and
1
2Stires, 1973). Personal factors, such as jurors' level of 
authoritarianism (Berg and Vidmar, 1975; Boehm, 1968; Bray 
and Noble, 1978; Centers, Shomer and Rodrigues, 1970;
Mitchell and Byrne, 1972) , their attitudes towards the death 
sentence (Jurow, 1971) and the nature of jurors' internal- 
external locus of control (Phares and Wilson, 1972) have also 
been shown to influence legal outcomes.
While several social psychological theories have been 
tested in studies using mock juries, a strong theoretical 
understanding of the process by which individual jurors arrive 
at a verdict preference has not emerged (Davis, Bray and Holt, 
1976) . Many of the theoretical models in jury research are 
essentially social decision schemas for estimating the math­
ematical probability of a jury's post deliberation group out­
come from individual jurors' initial choices (e.g., Davis,
Bray and Holt, 1976; Gelfand and Solomon, 1974; Kalven and 
Zeisal, 1966). The success of these schemas accentuates the 
ecological importance of also understanding how individual 
jurors arrive at their preferences prior to deliberation.
Reinforcement theory (e.g., Byrne, 1971; Byrne and 
Clore, 1970; Landy and Aronson, 1969) offers one account of 
how extralegal elements of the trial can influence a jury's 
decision. Factors such as the defendant's character or 
attractiveness produce positive or negative affect in the 
juror. Through classical conditioning, this response becomes 
attached to the defendant and leads to a shift in the direc­
tion of the verdict.
3Sigall and Ostrove (1975) have illustrated that while 
the reinforcement model accounts for some juridic processes, 
the relationship of affect to verdict can be a bit more com­
plex. They discovered that physical attractiveness, a factor 
which normally induces positive affect, can actually be detri­
mental to a defendant accused of swindle. Attractiveness 
facilitates commission of this crime because victims are more 
likely to be swayed or charmed by an attractive swindler. An 
attractive defendant may be a more potentially successful 
swindler and jurors therefore find him more likely to have com­
mitted the crime. Thus while affect appears to have a biasing 
influence, factors which produce affect might also have some 
cognitive value when considered in relation to the crime and 
trial situation.
Some social psychological approaches focus on the role 
of information processing on decision making. Kaplan and 
Kemmerick (1974), for example, have claimed that pieces of 
evidential and nonevidential information of varying subjective 
value are combined additively (Fishbein, 1967) and the particu­
lar value of each piece of information is determined through 
some sort of attribution process (e.g., Jones and Davis, 1972; 
Kelley, 1973). However, the authors do not specify the pro­
cess and focus more on how information is combined rather than 
on how it is weighted. They tested their model by manipulating 
positive, neutral or negative character information and high 
or low incriminating evidence in a factorial design. As pre­
dicted, more favorable character information and lower
4incriminating evidence decreased assessments of guilt in an 
additive fashion. In the integrative approach of Ostrom, 
Werner and Saks (1978) , verdicts are a weighted average 
(Anderson, 1967) of jurors' initial attitudes toward the 
defendant and subsequent trial material. The more negative 
the initial attitude toward the defendant and the stronger 
the evidence of guilt, the more likely jurors were to convict 
the defendant.
However, legal literature has suggested that there is 
a side to juridic decision making that is not based merely 
on consideration of evidence. Quinney (1970), for example, 
holds the Marxist view that the American system attempts to 
keep the ruling class in power. This approach to justice 
suggests a variety of ways in which a trial can be influenced 
by systematic bias in interpreting information. Perhaps a way 
to conceptualize this subjective side is to posit that ver­
dicts are more than a function of several factors; they are 
also a function of the weights which jurors decide to assign 
factors. The weighting process is made complex by the fact 
that reactions to one piece of information may interact with 
interpretations of other pieces. For example, if personal 
information about the defendant comes out in testimony, this 
information may be combined with other units of evidence to 
arrive at a verdict. However, various evaluations of personal 
information may lead jurors to form different guilt assess­
ments and subsequently may lead to quite different interpre­
tations of evidence linking the defendant to the crime.
5Cognitive consistency processes may be one key to understand­
ing how these evaluations occur.
Efran (1974), for example, examined one instance in 
which jurors' evaluations of evidence were altered by extra- 
legal factors. Attractiveness of the defendant was varied 
along with trial information. While attractiveness did in­
fluence verdicts in some conditions, it failed to do so when 
evidence was strongly against the defendant. In this case, 
jurors reliably found him guilty irrespective of appearance.
The interesting result was that jurors with the more incrim­
inating evidence felt the defendant was less attractive.
Efran proposed a cognitive dissonance explanation for the 
findings; incriminating evidence produced a tendency toward 
conviction and attractiveness toward acquittal. To reduce 
the discrepancy, jurors lowered their assessments of attrac­
tiveness. Vidmar (1972) also found that following a verdict, 
jurors' evaluations of evidence were congruent with the ver­
dict rendered.
Juror decision making provides a context that has unique 
characteristics in comparison to other types of information 
processing. For example, in policy making situations, the 
outcome alternatives can often be modified before a final 
decision is made. In various types of elections, though a 
forced choice is required, this choice has a number of mean­
ings; for example, both candidates are good but one is better, 
or both candidates are bad and one is the lesser of two evils. 
In the courtroom however, a guilty verdict implies that
6information indicating innocence was wrong. A one sided 
choice must emerge after two sided presentation of evidence 
and therefore information can be subject to a variety of 
interpretations. Thus greater focus on the nature of sub­
jective weighting processes may greatly enhance the theo­
retical perspective offered by information integration 
theorists.
A systematic model of courtroom decision making must 
provide a framework to explain the general nature of juror 
subjectivity. To account more fully for the human factor 
in the courtroom, psychologists must understand what leads 
jurors to weigh certain information heavily and reject other 
information. Affect certainly plays a role in the verdict, 
but when is affect important and how does it interact with 
the processing of evidence? Jurors may distort discrepant 
trial information to arrive at a consistent interpretation 
of this information, but what rule governs the means by 
which consistency is achieved and the subsequent effect of 
this outcome on verdict?
One concept holds promise for addressing these issues: 
the statistical notion of hypothesis testing (Feinberg, 1971). 
A variety of research has attempted to apply a Type I-Type II 
error schema to legal psychology. The Type I error has been 
previously defined as convicting an innocent defendant (e.g., 
Kerr, 1978). Reciprocally, a Type II error can be defined 
as acquitting a guilty one. As in the statistical model, 
the two tendencies oppose each other; the more jurors attempt
7to avoid Type I errors, the more stringent they set their 
alpha level and the more likely they are to make Type II 
errors. In other words, as jurors attempt to lower the prob­
ability of sending innocent defendants to jail, they increase 
the probability of letting the guilty go free and vice versa.
Research has focused on the Type I error. The bulk 
of experimental work has centered on the judge's "charge to 
the jury" about the standard of proof in criminal cases 
(i.e., his/her verbal instructions that the defendant is 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable shadow of 
a doubt, Supreme Court Reporter, 1971). Because this natur­
ally occurring courtroom event controls the definition of 
due process it is a clearcut manipulation of the alpha level 
and Type I error (Frank, 1973; Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, 
Holt and Davis, 1976; Owen, 1973; Sealy and Cornish, 1973) . 
The jury is provided with a criterion to judge at what point 
there is enough evidence to convict.
Judicial instructions from several states provide a 
variety of definitions of reasonable doubt. These criteria 
can range from "you must be sure and certain on the evidence 
that the accused is guilty" to "you must feel satisfied that 
it is more likely than not that the accused is guilty"
(Kerr et al., 1976). The more stringent the criterion the 
lower the conviction rate.
Despite the great variation in charges, experimental 
manipulations of these instructions has not produced strong 
effects. In Frank (1973) and Sealy and Cornish's (1973)
8work, instructions produced no effects. Kerr et al. (1976) 
fourtd that judges' instructions did have effects but only for 
extremely mixed evidence. Furthermore, stringent instructions 
resulted only in more hung juries, not in more acquittals.
Several possible reasons exist for the weakness of 
these manipulations. Kerr et al. (1976) suggest, perhaps 
"guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" is subject to a number of 
interpretations each evoking its own criterion. Perhaps as 
Frank (1973) suggests, the instructions are confusing to 
people. Furthermore, jurors familiar with the reasonable 
doubt concept may already have their own interpretation and 
choose to ignore the judge's viewpoint.
Recently, Kerr (1978) has suggested a broader opera­
tionalization of the Type I error. Rather than the criterion 
being set by the judge, in Kerr's work the possible conse­
quences of the juror's decision became a determinant of his 
or her criterion.
Kerr's work stems from the Vidmar (1972) "Algiers 
Motel" experiment and several subsequent studies (Hester 
and Smith, 1973; Kaplan and Simon, 1972; McComas and Noll, 
1974; Robertson, Rich and Ross, 1973). In the "Algiers Motel" 
study, the defendant was accused of robbing a motel office 
and killing the proprietor in the act. Pretest jurors rated 
the severity of the crime as somewhere between manslaughter 
and second degree murder. Jurors in different conditions 
read this crime and were required to find the defendant 
guilty or not guilty of various charges. When forced to
9choose between guilty of first degree murder or not guilty*
46% of the jurors found the man quilty. When more reasonable 
or a greater number of alternatives were available subjects 
convicted the defendant more often. About 92% of the jurors 
convicted the man when four decision alternatives were avail­
able.
Kerr, using the same stimuli as Vidmar, examined the 
effects of charge seriousness and prescribed penalty. Over­
all, he found that when more serious penalties followed con­
viction or when less choice of penalty existed, jurors ac­
quitted the defendant more often and required more evidence 
to convict. He posited that as penalty increases, the con­
sequences of a Type I error become more serious. Consequently, 
as the criterion for conviction rises, the chance of a false 
positive decision (alpha) becomes lower and conviction be­
comes unlikely. Kerr drew upon Thomas and Hogue's (1976) 
model to explain the relationship between conviction and guilt 
with a hypothetical quantitative model. When the amount of 
convicting evidence is greater than the criterion for con­
viction, the conviction will result; when the amount of evi­
dence is less, acquittal will result.
The present research attempts to extend the work of 
Kerr et al. (1976) and Kerr (1978) to devise a theoretical 
framework which will tie together various aspects of juridic 
decision making. Jurors' final verdicts may be strongly 
affected by the criterion of guilt (alpha level) they estab­
lish due to the consequences of each error. However,
decisions may also be a function of the pieces of information 
they decide to accept and the weight they give to each par­
ticular piece. Perhaps the consequences of the Type I and 
Type II error mediate these processes as well. The stronger 
the consequences of the Type I error relative to the Type II 
error, the more jurors become concerned with due process 
(Kaplan, 1975; Packer, 1968) and the more likely they are 
to interpret information in a manner favorable to the defen­
dant. This concern with due process will be called a Type I 
error orientation. The stronger the consequences of the 
Type II error relative to the Type I error, the more con­
cerned they become with crime control (Kaplan, 1975; Packer, 
1968) and the more likely they are to interpret information 
in a way unfavorable to the defendant. This concern with 
crime control will be called a Type II error orientation. 
Thus, the strength of the Type I and Type II error is not 
only posited to influence alpha levels but also to provide 
jurors with an orientation toward processing trial informa­
tion.
This Type I-Type II error orientation can serve as an 
organizing principle which incorporates findings from pre­
vious research. For example, the impact of affect laden 
extralegal factors such as physical attractiveness has been 
shown to sway jurors' decisions. However, how does this 
occur? A juror cannot in good conscience acknowledge physi­
cal attractiveness as a piece of evidence. More likely, 
affective factors change jurors' Type I-Type II error
orientation; it becomes a more serious error to wrongly con­
vict an attractive defendant because of the positive feelings 
he/she evokes or because attractive people are perceived as 
"good" (Dion, Bersheid and Walster, 1972). Subsequently, 
the juror may weigh evidence more in the attractive suspect's 
favor and be more likely to acquit him/her. If on the other 
hand, the crime is one such as swindle where attractiveness 
facilitates success, then it becomes a more dangerous error 
to let a potentially more successful criminal free. There­
fore, evidence is weighed more strongly against the defendant 
(as occurred in Sigall and Ostrove, 1975).
Similarly, when jurors process discrepant information, 
they may distort some of it in order to arrive at consistent 
conclusions. The hypothesis testing model provides a frame­
work to account for how this may occur; various factors in 
the case such as crime severity and liking for the defendant 
produce Type I (due process) or Type II (crime control) orien­
tations in the juror. When discrepant pieces of information 
must be considered, those consistent with the juror's Type I- 
Type II error orientation will be weighted heavily, while 
those that are inconsistent will be discounted (e.g., Kelley, 
1972). Thus, when a crime is so severe that the potential 
Type II error is high, or when evidence is so strong that a 
Type I error is unlikely, the juror will probably ignore af­
fectively positive extralegal factors such as the defendant's 
physical attractiveness (e.g., Efran, 1974).
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This research tests a modified hypothesis testing 
model (Type I-Type II error orientation model) by manipu­
lating the nature of the crime presented to mock jurors.
In one condition, the perpetrator steals a car, while in the 
other condition he steals the car and runs over a mother and 
her daughter in the act, killing the mother and paralyzing 
the little girl. While the latter set of crimes deserves 
a harsher sentence, objectively the verdict should be unaf­
fected by crime severity. Evidence linking the defendant 
to the acts in each condition is highly similar and unlike 
previous research, the characteristics of the man on trial 
are identical.
However, because the auto theft-hit and run crime has 
stronger negative consequences, jurors are expected to find 
the defendant guilty more often. The Type II error of let­
ting a guilty defendant free is more serious because the 
perpetrator is a potentially more dangerous criminal and be­
cause he is more deserving of punishment in this condition. 
Thus, evidence is likely to be interpreted in a manner un­
favorable to the defendant and reactions toward the defendant 
are likely to be more negative.
Results on dependent measures are expected to be con­
sistent with this model. On the three measures of verdict 
(guilt or innocence, degree of guilt and likelihood of guilt) 
jurors are expected to be more guilt oriented in the severe 
crime condition. On the five items assessing emotional reac­
tions toward the suspect, ratings should be more negative
13
with the serious crime. Furthermore, the negative emotional 
reaction toward the suspect is predicted to be more highly 
correlated with guilt in this condition, indicating that 
those swayed toward guilt also form negative reactions to­
wards the defendant consistent with their verdict. Two 
scales indirectly assess the strength of jurors' Type II 
error orientation. These dimensions are expected to be 
highly correlated with the reactions toward the suspect 
and with verdict.
Negative emotional reaction is expected to mediate 
the relationship between Type II error and verdict. That is, 
with the more serious crime the potential consequences of a 
Type II error are higher and subjects are likely to distort 
information in a way unfavorable to the defendant. One in­
dicator of this process is the emotional reactions they form 
toward the defendant. Stronger guilt ratings may not be a 
direct outcome of the seriousness of the crime but rather a 
function of jurors' evaluations of the defendant irrationally 
altered by crime outcome. Thus crime severity, an extralegal 
factor in verdict formation, is expected to indirectly affect 
verdict.
A more direct measure of information distortion would 
be to actually assess how jurors process evidence. Evidence 
processing was operationalized by having jurors write one- 
half page open-ended reports about why they reached the ver­
dicts they did. These reports should show that jurors facing 
a stronger Type II error will process information in a manner
14
more unfavorable to the defendant. In sum, guilt oriented 
ratings may be a function of stronger reactions against the 
defendant and more unfavorable evidence interpretation be­
cause of the stronger negative emotional reaction produced 
by the crime. Findings consistent with this analysis cannot 
definitively prove that the causal relationship between Type 
II errors, information processing and guilt exists. However, 
results can show the existence of a relationship between 
crime severity and verdict and, therefore, can demonstrate 
that the present model is a plausible account worthy of fur­
ther investigation.
The expected results are opposite to the findings of 
previous research. Kerr (1978) claimed that more serious 
charges cause more serious consequences for Type I errors 
because the defendant faces a more severe penalty. The 
jurors should acquit the defendant more often. In the present 
research, the defendant also would face a more severe penalty 
if convicted of a more serious crime. However, the negative 
elements of the crime are expected to be more salient than 
the sentence facing the defendant because sentencing is never 
mentioned or dealt with as an issue. While some jurors may 
be swayed by the harsher sentence facing the defendant with 
the serious crime, more are expected to be swayed toward con­




Seventy-two male and seventy-two female jurors parti­
cipated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a require­
ment for their introductory psychology course. Nine parti­
cipants of each gender were assigned to every cell in the 
design.
Design
The study originally employed a 2x2x2x2 between sub­
jects design. The two levels of crime severity tested the 
hypothesis of the experiment. These were crossed with three 
other factors: an eyewitness testimony factor which manipulated 
whether or not the key eyewitness could pick the defendant 
out of a police lineup, a location factor which manipulated 
whether or not the defendant resided near the scene of the 
crime and a sex of subject factor.
Stimulus Material
Jurors received booklets containing all the trial 
information (see Appendix 1). Following a cover page which 
introduced the study, booklets began with a one-page descrip­
tion of the crime, including details about the location of 
the incident, the perpetrator's actions and the apprehension 
and booking of the suspect. The perpetrator, noticing keys
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left in the ignition of a car, runs to the car, starts the 
engine and drives away. A couple of hours later, police 
apprehend a suspect four blocks from the location of the 
stolen vehicle.
The nature of the crime is manipulated on the first 
page. In half of the cases, the perpetrator while driving 
away in the stolen car, swerves towards and strikes a mother 
and her daughter. The mother is killed and the daughter 
paralyzed. Remaining jurors received a description of just 
the auto theft.
The next four pages of the booklet contained case 
transcripts edited for authenticity by a district court 
judge.1 In these transcripts, two witnesses gave testimony; 
a woman who saw the crime and gave a description of the per­
petrator and the police officer who arrested the defendant 
based on the woman's description. Booklets explained that no 
other evidence was available.
Transcripts were constructed so that evidence did not 
link the suspect more closely to the crime in one case than 
the other. The policeman's testimony was identical across 
conditions. The eyewitness to the crime had to describe 
somewhat different events in each condition. However, the 
location of the crime, her location at the incident, the cer­
tainty of her testimony and the accuracy, length and detail
1The author would like to thank Judge Constantino of 
the District Court of Clinton, Massachusetts for his time 
and effort in reviewing and editing experimental stimuli.
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of her account were kept constant across conditions. In the 
more serious case, she described the defendant stealing the 
car, glancing at the victims, swerving toward them and strik­
ing them. In the less serious case she described the defen­
dant stealing the car, glancing at a red light, swerving
away from the curb and driving through the light.
In the transcripts, two sets of evidence were manipu­
lated. The strength of the eyewitness' testimony was varied. 
For half of the cases, she was capable of identifying the 
defendant in a police lineup (incriminating evidence condi­
tion) , while for the other half she picked the wrong man from 
the lineup (nonincriminating evidence condition). This fac­
tor was brought up during cross examination. The prosecuting 
attorney mentioned her success in identifying the defendant 
in the incriminating evidence condition, while the defense 
attorney noted her failure in the nonincriminating evidence 
condition. The length of this segment was equal across cells. 
A second factor was the residence of the defendant. In one 
condition, the defendant resided near the scene of the crime, 
making him more likely to have committed the crime. In the 
other condition, he resided near where the police apprehended 
him, making him more likely to be a victim of mistaken iden­
tity.
These evidence factors may provide a validity check 
for the crime severity effect. While evidence is kept as 
constant as possible across crime severity conditions, slight 
differences are still possible due to the different nature
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of each crime. However, if the crime severity effect is as 
strong or stronger than the eyewitness identification or 
location variables, then it would be unlikely for this effect 
to be an artifact of different evidence in each condition. 
Jurors should be less sensitive to subtle evidence effects 
across crime conditions than they are to a factor such as 
the key eyewitness1 ability to identify the suspect in a 
police lineup.
Dependent Measures
Attached to the booklets were a set of seventeen depen­
dent measures. All measures were eleven point scales with 
the exception of three forced choice items. Each of the 
eleven point scales were labelled at endpoints (see Appendix 
2) .
Manipulation checks. The auto theft-hit and run crime 
was posited to be more serious than the auto theft alone 
crime. To check this assumption, an updated modification 
of the Sellin-Wolfgang scale (Roth, 1978) was used. This 
scale ranged from 1 to approximately 110, 1 representing an 
extremely mild crime and 110 an extremely severe one. Next 
to various numbers were crime labels (e.g., "$1000 theft," 
"$10,000 armed robbery," "rape," etc.) which aided jurors in 
interpreting numerical values on- the scale.
The eyewitness testimony factor varied whether or not 
the key eyewitness could select the defendant from a police 
lineup. The success of this manipulation was assessed through
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the accuracy of jurors' recall as to whether or not her 
identification was correct. Jurors were also asked whether 
or not they believed her testimony and if her testimony had 
an effect on their verdict.
To check on the location factor, jurors were asked 
both where the crime was committed and where the defendant 
resided. Accuracy of recall was again assessed. Jurors were 
also asked to judge the effect which the crime's location had 
on their verdict.
Verdict. Verdict was assessed through a forced choice 
"innocent" or "guilty" item. Scales also assessed degree of 
guilt and likelihood of guilt. These two items were separated 
by eight scales so that jurors' responses on one dimension 
would be as distinct as possible from their responses on the 
other. The likelihood of guilt item asked "how likely do you 
think it was that the defendant committed the crime?" While 
verdict could be a function of more than one factor, this 
measure was of particular interest because it assessed jurors' 
judgments of a single dimension (i.e., whether or not the 
defendant was the perpetrator).
Emotional reactions toward the defendant. The jurors' 
emotional reactions toward the defendant were assessed with 
self ratings of anger, sympathy, threat, suspicion and dislike. 
These reactions were expected to be low in general but more 
negative in the severe crime condition. The defendant did not 
take the stand and almost no personal information of affective 
value existed. Thus, little reason existed to form an
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impression of him. However, these measures could serve as 
assessors of one form of information distortion (i.e., how 
jurors changed evaluations of their emotional reactions 
toward the defendant).
Reactions to the crime. An indirect measure of the 
Type II error orientation can be obtained by assessing how 
negatively jurors reacted to the crime. This dimension was 
assessed with scales asking "how important is it for the per­
petrator of this crime to be caught and prosecuted?" and 
"how angry does a crime of this nature make you?"
Jurors' self-report data. Upon completion of the 
scales, jurors were required to write a one-half page state­
ment describing why they found the defendant innocent or 
guilty. No time limit was imposed for this task. These 
statements were expected to show a different pattern of re­
sults across crime severity conditions.
Procedure
Ten to twenty jurors were run at a time. Booklets were 
randomly distributed and as many cells as possible were repre­
sented in each session.
Upon entering the laboratory, jurors were handed an 
experimental booklet. They were instructed that the experi­
ment involved role playing mock jurors and that they would be 
presented with an abbreviated version of a courtroom case. 
After reading the case contained in the booklet, they were 
instructed to fill out the attached scales as if they were
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real jurors passing judgment. Jurors sat at least a seat 
apart from each other, but in case another's responses were 
visible, they were informed that each juror would be respond­
ing to a different case. Finally, they were instructed not 
to turn back to the case once they began filling out scales. 
This instruction was given so that manipulation checks re­
quiring memory of material would be valid.
III. RESULTS
General Description
Dependent measures were analyzed in five distinct 
groupings: manipulation checks, verdict measures, emotional 
reactions toward the defendant measures, reactions to the 
crime (Type II error orientation) measures and juror self 
report measures. Because manipulation checks tested the 
validity of the crime severity, eyewitness testimony and 
location factors, they are reported first. Next, significant 
multivariate and univariate analyses of variance findings are 
reported separately for the verdict, reactions to the defen­
dant and reactions to the crime variables. These analyses 
were carried out to assess how the various manipulations 
affected jurors' reactions to the trial.
Note that the suspicion dimension was initially concep­
tualized as a measure of emotional reaction. However, results 
indicated that it correlated equally with verdict and emotion 
measures. Therefore, this scale is incorporated in MANOVAS 
for both sets of variables. Also, only main effects are re­
ported for all F tests. Interactive effects did not show 
multivariate significance and the number of second, third and 
fourth order univariate interactions significant at the .05 
level was less than expected by chance. With nine variables 
on each of eleven interactive effects, ninety-nine significance 
tests were performed. Of these, five can be expected to be
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significant by chance alone. However, only one interactive 
effect was significant. This effect did not interact with 
any of the main effects reported.
Finally chi square analyses of variance performed on 
response frequency for juror self report data are reported. 
Comparisons were made between the two crime severity condi­
tions to test if jurors were distorting trial information in 
arriving at a verdict. Responses were also examined as descrip­
tive measures to explore the variation in information inter­
pretation especially between those jurors convicting the defen­
dant and those acquitting him.
In general, while analyses of variance showed a pattern 
of differences across conditions they could not show how 
measures of verdict, emotional reactions toward the defendant 
and reactions to the crime (Type II error orientation) mea­
sures influenced each other. The hypothesis of the experiment 
was that reactions to the crime would affect processing of 
trial information and emotional reactions toward the defendant. 
These "mediating variables" would then affect verdict. To 
assess the relationships among variables, ancillary analyses 
were performed.
First, three sets of correlations were examined; one 
for all data and one for each of the two crime severity con­
ditions. Separate correlation patterns for each condition 
were of particular interest because it was expected that emo­
tional reactions would have much higher relationships to ver­
dict with a severe crime than they would with a less severe
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one. This would be one indication that emotional reactions 
were mediating the relationship between crime severity and 
verdict.
Next as an exploratory test of the present model, path 
analyses were performed on verdict, emotional reactions to­
ward the defendant and reactions to the crime (Type II error 
orientation) dimensions. Scales were combined so that one 
score represented each dimension. Clustering was based on 
correlation matrices and a varimax rotated factor analysis 
performed on all measures except manipulation checks. Finally, 
regression paths were examined separately for jurors render­
ing innocent verdicts and those rendering guilty verdicts in 
the severe crime condition. Convicting jurors should be most 
influenced by these processes.
Manipulation Checks
As expected, the auto theft-hit and run crime was rated 
as significantly more severe (x = 65.11 for the auto theft- 
hit and run case and x = 17.32 for the auto theft alone condi­
tion, F (1/128) = 307.63, p < .01). Every juror in the auto 
theft-hit and run condition reported the case as more severe 
than every juror in the auto theft alone condition. For the 
testimony effect, 134 out of 144 jurors knew whether or not 
the eyewitness could pick the defendant out of a police lineup. 
The remaining ten appeared to be distributed randomly through­
out conditions and did not present a serious threat to validity. 
However, jurors on the whole did not report being more
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influenced by the eyewitness1 testimony or believing her more 
when she could identify the suspect. In general then, jurors 
were aware of this information but did not report being af­
fected by it.
The location manipulation failed to function effectively. 
Of the 144 subjects only 49 could properly identify both 
where the car was stolen and where the defendant resided.
Jurors did not report being influenced by the defendant's 
residence (F < 1) and analyses with this factor yielded no 
significant effects. In describing remaining tests, ratings 
are collapsed across the location factor.
Verdict Measures
Significant verdict main effects occurred on both the 
crime severity and eyewitness testimony factors. The primary 
prediction of the experiment was that jurors in the auto 
theft-hit and run condition would be more guilt oriented than 
those in the auto theft alone condition. Significant differ­
ences in the predicted direction occurred on all measures of 
verdict (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).
Since the innocent-guilty dimension was a dichotomous one, 
it was not analyzed in the MANOVA used for remaining verdict 
items. About 29% of the jurors receiving the more serious
crime found the defendant guilty versus only 12.5% of those
2getting the less serious one (X (1) = 5.1, p < .03). A multi­
variate analysis of variance was performed on guilt measures.
The multivariate F was significant (£ < .02) and univariate
TABLE 1
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Verdict Measures as a Function 
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evidence 4.00 2.14 4.06 1.80 44.44 19.17
Nonincriminating
evidence 3.50 1.96 2.06 1.63 37.22 17.76
Note. The "degree of guilt" scale was originally a -5 to +5 scale. However every 
score was raised 5 points to make ratings range from 0 to 10. Thus "degree of guilt" and 
"suspicion" are 0 to 10 dimensions while "likelihood of guilt" ranges from 0 to 100.
main effects for degree of guilt (p < .02), suspicion (g> <
.01) and likelihood of guilt (p < .03) were significant (see 
Table 2).
The testimony factor manipulated the ability of the 
eyewitness to pick the defendant out of a police lineup. This 
should be an important piece of information because one would 
expect that her failure to identify the defendant leaves very 
little evidence against him. However, the overall effects of 
this variable on trial outcome were slightly weaker (as shown 
by the canonical R) than the effects of crime severity.
Jurors receiving the more incriminating evidence did find the 
defendant more suspicious (p < .02) and more likely to have 
committed the crime (p < .02). The magnitude of these effects 
was about equal to the crime severity factor. However, un­
like the crime severity factor, jurors did not reach a signif­
icantly greater number of guilty verdicts (25% found the 
defendant guilty in the incriminating evidence condition and 
16.7% found him guilty in the nonincriminating evidence con­
dition) . They also failed to find the defendant more guilty 
(p < .15). Multivariate effects for the testimony factor were 
significant (p < .05). (See Tables 1 and 2 for these compari­
sons .)
Emotional Reactions Toward the Defendant
The crime severity factor was the only one producing 
significant effects on emotional reactions measures (see 
Table 3 for means and standard deviations). Jurors' reactions
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TABLE 2
Multivariate and Univariate Tests for Significance 
for Crime Severity and Eyewitness Testimony 
Effects on Verdict Measures
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of Freedom F value P value
Degree 
of Guilt 35.01 1/136 6.65 .011
Suspicion 52.56 1/136 9.23 .003
Likelihood 
of Guilt 2256.25 1/136 5.18 .024
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of Freedom F value P value
Degree 
of Guilt 11.67 1/136 2.22 .140
Suspicion 37.01 1/136 6.50 .012
Likelihood 
of Guilt 2756.25 1/136 6.32 .013
TABLE 3
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Emotional Reactions 
Toward the Defendant Measures as a Function of Crime 
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^The letter I stands for the incriminating testimony condition or the success of 
the eyewitness to identify the defendant in a police lineup.
2
The letter N stands for the nonincriminating testimony condition or the failure 
of the eyewitness to identify the defendant in a police lineup.
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toward the criminal were significantly more negative in the 
auto theft-hit and run condition than they were in the auto 
theft alone condition despite the fact that guilt had not 
been established. The multivariate finding was significant 
(p < .01) and jurors as expected reported their feelings of 
anger (p < .01),. dislike (p < .01), threat (p < .01), and 
suspicion (p < .01) as significantly stronger in the serious 
crime condition (see Table 4 for significance tests). These 
results indicate that the nature of the crime produced a 
cluster of differences most of which by lav; or rational thought 
should not have been part of decision making.
Reactions to the Crime
The reactions to the crime measures were constructed 
to operationalize the Type II error orientation concept.
Again, significant effects appeared only on the crime severity 
factor (see Table 5 for means and standard deviations). The 
multivariate analysis of variance (p < .01) and univariate 
tests on "anger at the crime" (p < .01) and importance of 
having the perpetrator caught (p < .01) were all significant 
(see Table 6 for significance tests).
Juror Self-report Data
The purpose of the juror self-report items was to assess 
the ways in which jurors processed trial information. "Rea­
sons for verdict" responses were tabulated and frequency com­
parisons were made both between crime severity conditions and
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TABLE 4
Multivariate and Univariate Tests of Significance 
for Crime Severity Effects on Emotional 
Reactions Toward the Defendant Measures
Multivariate Effect
F Value Degrees of Freedom P less than Canonical R






of Freedom F Value P less than
Anger 162.56 1/136 32.34 .001
Sympathy 7.11 1/136 .90 .350
Threat 49.00 1/136 14.77 .001
Suspicion 52.56 1/136 9.23 .003
Dislike 45.56 1/136 10.47 .002
TABLE 5
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Reactions to the Crime 
Measures (Type II errors) as a Function of Crime 
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Multivariate and Univariate Tests of Significance 
for Crime Severity Effects on Reactions 
to the Crime Measures
Multivariate Effect
F Value Degrees of Freedom P less than Canonical R 






















between jurors finding the defendant innocent and those find­
ing him guilty.
Due to the nonparametric nature of the data and the 
variety of reasons given by jurors for their verdict, most 
differences between crime severity conditions were not signif­
icant with a chi. analysis of variance. Rather a pattern of 
moderate effects seemed to occur. For example, more jurors 
receiving the milder crime paid attention to the defendant's 
race, making some sort of statement about race being held 
against him such as "he was railroaded because he was Black."
In the severe crime condition 13.7% of the jurors recognized 
this fact, while in the mild crime condition 22.3% paid atten­
tion to it. More jurors in the severe crime condition on the 
other hand, paid attention to the fact that the defendant 
could not account for his whereabouts (25% in the severe crime 
condition versus 11% in the auto theft alone condition).
A Type I error orientation was defined in the self 
reports by some form of the statements "reasonable doubt," 
"innocent until proven guilty" or "keep an innocent defendant 
out of jail." Concern for Type I errors should have resulted 
in more acquittals. However, results indicated that jurors 
receiving the auto theft-hit and run crimes were more often 
concerned with Type I errors despite the fact that jurors in 
this condition overall found the defendant more guilty. Sixty- 
three percent of those acquitting the suspect in the severe 
crime condition and only 41.3% in the mild condition expressed 
the desire to avoid Type I errors. Apparently, the auto theft-
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hit and run crime was linked with a longer jail sentence and 
aroused concern for the defendant, as some jurors indicated.
Further analysis of self report data revealed inter­
esting differences in reported processing of trial informa­
tion between convicting and acquitting jurors. The same units 
of information were used by some jurors to find the defendant 
innocent and by others to find him guilty. For example, the 
police apprehended the suspect four blocks from the crime. 
Fifty-seven percent of those jurors convicting the defendant 
felt that this proved guilt while 26.3% of those acquitting 
the defendant felt that this proved innocence. Similar results 
occurred with a variety of evidence. The eyewitness, for 
example, was perceived as trustworthy and reliable by those 
jurors convicting the defendant and as dishonest and unreliable 
by those jurors acquitting him. The arresting officer was 
perceived to be correctly doing his job by jurors convicting 
the defendant. In fact, 48% of these jurors cited the officer's 
identification and arrest of the defendant as one reason for 
their verdict. Meanwhile, no juror acquitting the defendant 
mentioned this fact and 24% of the acquitting jurors actually 
claimed that the officer was "biased," "racist" or "perse­
cuting the defendant."
Ancillary Analyses
Correlations between variables. Because of the different 
patterns of correlations between crime severity conditions, 
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Severe and Mild Crime Conditions
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These separate patterns best illustrate the relationship of 
emotional reactions toward the defendant measures to verdict 
measures. In general, an interesting and intuitively logical 
pattern emerged. Emotional reactions toward the defendant 
had a much stronger relationship with guilt for the auto 
theft-hit and run crime than it did for the auto theft alone 
crime. With the auto theft-hit and run crime, likelihood of 
guilt had a r of .56 with emotional reactions toward the 
defendant (p < .01) and degree of guilt had an r of .45 with 
these measures (£ < .01). With the auto theft alone crime, 
likelihood of guilt showed an r of .21 with the emotional 
reactions measures (n.s.) and degree of guilt showed an r 
of .15 (n.s.).
As Table 7 indicates, the correlations between "reac­
tions to the crime" measures and verdict were low for both 
crime severity conditions. This lack of strong correlation 
was not expected here.
Exploratory model analysis. The present hypotheses 
claim that the relationship between Type II error and verdict 
is mediated by distortion of both evidence and assessments 
of the defendant. To test the potential validity of this 
model, path analyses were performed using partial beta weights 
from multiple regression analyses. Two separate analyses 
were performed; one on total data and one on the severe crime 
condition.
Prior to the analyses, composite scales were formed 
for three dimensions. The "Type II error orientation"
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dimension was operationalized with "anger at the crime" and 
"importance of having the criminal caught" scales. Informa­
tion distortion was operationalized with scales of threat, 
anger and dislike toward the defendant. This composite was 
called the emotional reactions dimension. Because interpre­
tations of factual evidence were only assessed with open 
ended reports, no metric existed to operationalize this dimen­
sion. Finally, the verdict dimension consisted of degree of 
guilt and likelihood of guilt items.
Raw scores representing each dimension were added to­
gether to form Type II error orientation, emotional mediator 
and verdict components for a path analysis. Justification 
for clustering was based on a priori conceptualizations, cor­
relation matrices and loadings on varimax rotated factor 
analyses. (See Table 8 for factor analyses.) For example, 
"suspicion of the defendant" was not clustered with any com­
ponent because it correlated and loaded ambiguously with both 
emotional reactions and verdict. "Sympathy for the defendant" 
was not used because its correlations with other emotion 
items and its loading with these items, on factor analyses 
were low. Overall, factor analyses done for all (n = 144) 
and severe condition jurors(n = 72) yielded three distinct 
factors. These factors fairly strongly matched the a priori 
conceptualizations of Type II error orientation, emotional 
reactions and verdict dimensions.
Figure 1 illustrates the causal pathway between Type 
II error orientation, emotional reaction and verdict components
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TABLE 8
Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings for All Data, 
Severe Crime Condition Data, and
Mild Crime Condition Data
Analysis of All Data
Variables Factors
1 2 3
Degree of Guilt .27 .76 .08
Anger at Defendant .85 .17 .19
Sympathy for Defendant .02 -.56 .09
Threat of Defendant .79 .19 .12
Suspicion of Defendant .57 .42 .21
Dislike for Defendant .85 .07 .10
Importance of Catching 
Criminal .12 .08 .86
Anger at the Crime .21 -.04 .86
Likelihood of Guilt .39 .82 .15





Degree of Guilt .26 .77 .15
Anger at Defendant .86 .24 .12
Sympathy for Defendant -.10 -.69 .13
Threat of Defendant .73 .28 .08
Suspicion of Defendant .57 .52 .08
Dislike for Defendant .87 .14 .12
Importance of Catching 
Criminal .08 .16 .57
Anger at the Crime .19 -.17 .75










Degree of Guilt .26 .77 .15
Anger at Defendant .86 .24 .12
Sympathy for Defendant -.10 -.69 .13
Threat of Defendant .73 .28 .08
Suspicion of Defendant .57 .52 .08
Dislike for Defendant .87 .14 .12
Importance of Catching 
Criminal .03 .16 .57
Anger at the Crime .19 -.17 .75
Likelihood of Guilt .40 .81 .09
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FIGURE 1
Tests of Regression Paths for All Data, 
Severe Crime Condition Data, and 
Mild Crime Condition Data
Analysis of All Data
Regression Path
Type II Error ^30__ Emotional Reactions ^46____ . ,. .
Orientation ~ Toward Defendant er ^ c
! *
I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ 0 6 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J
Table of Direct and Indirect Relationships
Direct Indirect Total
Relationship Correlation Correlation Correlation
Type II Error 
Orientation—
Emotional Reaction .30   .30
Type II Error 
Orientation—
Verdict .06 .14 .20
Emotional Reaction 
— Verdict .46 .01 .47
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FIGURE 1— Continued
Analysis of Severe Crime Data
Regression Path
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suggested by the present hypothesis. Though the correlation 
between Type II error orientation and verdict is low, the 
suggested model is strongly supported by the data. That is, 
across all data, the mediating effects of emotional reaction 
accounted for twice as much of the correlation and four 
times as much variability as the direct effect of Type II 
error orientation alone on verdict did. With the severe con­
dition data, almost all variability shared between Type II 
error orientation and verdict could be accounted for by the 
mediating effects of emotional measures.
Because of the weak correlation between Type II error 
orientation measures and verdict in the mild crime condition 
(r = .08) further analyses of this data were unwarranted 
(see Figure 1). In general, two explanations could be given 
for the unexpectedly low correlations between these dimensions 
in both crime severity conditions. Perhaps because the rela­
tionship between Type II error orientation and verdict is al­
most completely a function of the mediation of other factors, 
a high r may be an unlikely occurrence. Secondly, for crime 
severity to show a strong relationship to verdict, perhaps 
this relationship must be examined across a number of crimes. 
The use of only two crimes may provide too restricted a range 
of variability.
Finally, separate analyses of regression paths were 
performed on acquitting and convicting jurors in the severe 
crime condition. In general, the major difference between 
these two groups was in the relationship between Type II
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error orientation and emotional reactions toward the defen­
dant (see Figure 2). A moderate relationship (r = .48, 
p < .05) existed between these dimensions with convicting 
jurors (n = 21) while no relationship (r = .00) existed be­
tween these dimensions with acquitting jurors (n = 52).
Also, convicting jurors reported significantly higher nega­
tive emotional reactions than acquitting jurors (x = 12.6 
for convicting jurors; x = 5.2 for acquitting jurors, p < 
.01). These findings lent strength to the hypothesis that 
emotional reactions toward the defendant served as some sort 
of mediating factor between Type II error orientation and 
verdict. That is, those jurors who found the defendant 
guilty perhaps did so as a result of a stronger negative 
emotional reaction toward the defendant stemming from their 
reactions to the crime (Type II error orientation). Again, 
a stronger relationship between Type II error orientation 
and verdict is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn.
FIGURE 2
Tests of Regression Paths for Acquitting and Convicting 
Jurors in the Severe Crime Condition
Analysis of Acquitting Jurors
Regression Path
Type II Error i00_3> Emotional Reactions 43 ^.verd’ct
Orientation Toward Defendant a
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I_________________________ .03___________________________ !
Table of Direct and Indirect Relationships
Direct Indirect Total
Relationship Correlation Correlation Correlation
Type II Error 
Orientation—
Emotional Reaction .00   .00
Type II Error 
Orientation—
Verdict .03 .01 .04
Emotional Reaction 
— Verdict .43 .00 .43
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FIGURE 2— Continued
Analysis of Convicting Jurors
Regression Path
Type II Error _. 4 8_ ^  Emotional Reactions ^40 ^verdict
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Table of Direct and Indirect Relationships
Direct Indirect Total
Relationship Correlation Correlation Correlation
Type II Error 
Orientation—
Emotional Reaction .48   .48
Type II Error 
Orientation—
Verdict -.01 .18 .19
Emotional Reaction 
— Verdict .40 .00 .40
IV. DISCUSSION
As in much mock juror research, the issue of external 
validity must be considered before drawing conclusions from 
the data. Subjects were not representative of a typical 
jury pool; they did not deliberate as a jury does, they knew 
that the trial was fictitious and they received written 
rather than live presentation. Until more is known about 
how experimental legal settings simulate actual courtroom 
situations, findings in studies of this nature must be con­
sidered suggestive rather than definitive (Kerr et al., 1976).
However, several points need to be made. Almost all 
jurors at the end of the experimental session reported being 
involved in the legal task. While an actual courtroom situa­
tion may produce different results, it seems likely that the 
emotional nature of a real trial might enhance the effects 
of this study. Furthermore, one purpose of this experiment 
was to discover more about the nature of human information 
processing in the courtroom. Whether or not specific findings 
in the experimental context are isomorphic to real world 
occurrences, the theoretical perspective eventually gained 
through research should apply to any context.
As expected, the nature of the crime presented to mock 
jurors affected their verdict despite the fact that evidence 
across conditions was highly similar. A more legally and 
emotionally severe set of crimes resulted in more guilty
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verdicts and higher assessments of degree of guilt, likeli­
hood of guilt and suspicion. While this crime deserved a 
harsher sentence, no strong reason existed to link the defen­
dant more to the incident.
The validity of this effect was further verified 
through comanipulation of an eyewitness testimony factor.
Not only were jurors affected by the nature of the crime 
factor but more so than they were by the ability of the key 
eyewitness to accurately identify the suspect. Thus even if 
slight differences in evidence existed between crime condi­
tions, this artifact was not likely to be responsible for 
the crime severity effect when a powerful, intentionally manipu­
lated evidence factor failed to produce results as strong.
Further analyses suggested an explanation of why the 
nature of the crime influenced verdict. In the severe crime 
condition, jurors had stronger negative reactions toward the 
suspect despite the fact that little reason existed to form 
an impression of him. Also the relationship between these 
emotional reactions and verdict was stronger in this condi­
tion. These findings implied that jurors formed their impres­
sion of the defendant based on the nature of the crime and 
that this impression was somehow related to the differences 
in verdict. While the correlation between reactions to the 
crime (Type II error orientation) and verdict was weak, path 
analyses indicated that the emotional reaction toward the 
defendant was indeed a strong mediator of this relationship; 
a severe crime may have produced more negative feelings
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toward the defendant which resulted in more guilty verdicts. 
These findings were particularly applicable to jurors render­
ing guilty verdicts in the severe crime condition.
It appeared that jurors distorted their impressions 
of the defendant based on the severity of the crime. Evi­
dence of information distortion could be seen in the self- 
report data. Jurors had extremely varied interpretations of 
the same trial information and strongest differences appeared 
between those convicting and those acquitting the defendant. 
Verdict seemed to be based on the manner in which jurors 
constructed trial information rather than on information 
alone. Further research may show how this subject construc­
tion influences verdict across crime severity conditions.
Several models can be examined with these findings.
A weighted averaging approach (e.g., Kaplan and Kemmerick, 
1974) would suggest that verdict differences occurred because 
jurors combined various subjectively weighted units of trial 
information to arrive at a verdict. The nature of the crime 
was one such unit having strong value. Consequently, the 
auto theft-hit and run crime received a more negative or 
guilt oriented weighting and produced more convictions. How­
ever, examination of results on the whole indicated that 
these processes were not occurring. At no point did jurors 
seem to consider crime severity as a factor. Rather crime 
severity seemed to affect the way jurors responded to other 
aspects of the trial situation. For example, jurors receiving 
the severe crime had more negative emotional reactions toward
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the suspect. These reactions then had a strong relationship 
with verdict.
Furthermore, the weighted averaging approach works on 
the assumption that each piece of evidence has a stable given 
meaning to each juror. The subjective importance of this 
meaning then determines to what extent various units of evi­
dence influence the verdict. However, self-report data 
showed that particular evidence had very different meanings 
to various jurors and that these meanings seemed to be based 
to a large extent on the context provided by other informa­
tion. If a weighted averaging approach is to work, component 
predictors of the final outcome cannot come from the stimulus 
material; they must come from jurors' interpretations of the 
material. While perhaps these conclusions appear prematurely 
based on one artificially constructed trial situation, it 
seems likely that the two-sided nature of the adversarial 
trial would produce the variety of evidence interpretation . 
found here.
A model combining reinforcement (Byrne end Clore, 1971) 
and cognitive dissonance (Efran, 1974; Festinger, 1957) or 
just world (Lerner, 1971) approaches fits the present data 
fairly well. Because the auto theft-hit and run crime in­
volved the death of a woman and the crippling of her daughter, 
it probably produced negative affect in jurors. Consequently, 
they convicted the defendant more often. However, a fuller 
understanding of the present data requires some sort of sup­
plementary cognitive explanation such as just world or
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dissonance theory. Jurors receiving the auto theft-hit and 
run crime are faced with two fairly contradictory cognitions:
(1) the crime was strongly deserving of punishment, and
(2) the evidence linking the defendant to the crime was not
that strong and so the defendant might not receive punish­
ment. Jurors unconsciously resolved this conflict by forming 
more negative feelings toward the defendant and becoming more 
suspicious of him. They thus could find him guiltier and at 
the same time not realize they were distorting the situation. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of various units of evidence 
could have been affected in a similar fashion by jurors' 
desire to achieve some sort of consistency in their informa­
tion processing. Jurors finding the defendant guilty per­
ceived the same facts in an entirely different fashion than 
remaining jurors. The nature of their interpretations was 
clearly consistent with the verdict they had reached.
As with much research involving reinforcement or cog­
nitive dissonance theory, post hoc explanations for the data 
are not refutable. However, these accounts have little pre­
dictive value. Furthermore, while they can explain any
specific trial outcome post hoc, they do not provide general 
predictive principles. For example, affective factors are 
not the sole determinants of information distortion. It 
seems likely that a strong piece of evidence could change 
jurors' interpretations of contradictory pieces independently 
of its affective value. In fact, almost all cases contain 
a combination of affective and factual information. At what
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point is one more salient than the other and how do the two 
get processed together? Secondly, trials often have strong 
opposing affective factors. The crime arouses affect which 
works against the suspect while the potential penalty arouses 
affect which works in the suspect's favor (e.g., Kerr, 1978; 
Pepitone, 1975; Vidmar, 1972). How and when do each play a 
role in the final outcome? These questions need to be an­
swered in future research.
A statistical hypothesis testing model can also be 
applied to the present findings and can address some of these 
issues. In any trial there are two possible mistakes a juror 
can make; he/she can convict an innocent suspect (Type I 
error) or acquit a guilty one (Type II error). A more severe 
crime increases the seriousness of each type of error because 
jurors potentially risk both freeing a more dangerous criminal 
and imposing a harsher penalty on an innocent suspect.
In the present situation however, the penalty was 
probably minimized because sentencing was never mentioned.
As a result, the nature of the crime may have been a more 
salient factor. With the auto theft-hit and run case, there­
fore, the Type II error was higher and the defendant was 
found guilty more often very possibly because of the less 
stringent alpha level set by jurors. Vidmar (.1972) and Kerr 
(1978) on the other hand, have tested cases where the poten­
tial penalty was extremely salient. Therefore as expected, 
jurors were very much affected by the Type I error and, when 
a harsher penalty was contingent upon conviction, more
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acquittals occurred probably as a result of a more stringent 
alpha level.
However these processes alone could not account for 
results. If verdicts changed merely because of a criterion 
shift, then ratings of likelihood of guilt should have been 
similar across the severe and mild crime conditions, while 
ratings of degree of guilt and verdict should have shown 
differences. In other words, jurors across conditions should 
have arrived at the same estimate of the probability that the 
defendant committed the crime. However, their criterion point 
for determining guilt may have differed across conditions and 
they should have rendered more guilty verdicts where the cri­
terion was lower (i.e., in the severe crime condition). In­
consistent with these predictions, findings indicated that 
differences on the likelihood of guilt scales were significant. 
Therefore, jurors were arriving at different interpretations 
of the evidence across conditions, not merely matching similar 
interpretations with a shifting criterion as Kerr (1978) sug­
gests .
A more complete explanation might expand upon the sta­
tistical hypothesis testing model. Jurors do acquire a sense 
of the Type I and Type II errors involved in the case and per­
haps can shift their criterion of guilt. This previous account 
can be conceptualized as a subjective expectancy model 
(Rotter, 1954). Verdict choice is a function of the positive 
and negative consequences of the decision times the proba­
bility, given the evidence that the decision is correct.
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However, another important principle may operate. The poten­
tial consequences of each decision also may bias the way in 
which jurors interpret evidence. The more severe the Type I 
error consequences of conviction seem, the more the juror 
might interpret evidence in a way favorable to the suspect. 
The more severe the Type II error consequences of acquittal 
seem, the more he/she might interpret evidence in an unfavor­
able way. Thus, for example, when the consequences of the 
Type II error seem high, the Type II error oriented juror 
not only needs more evidence to convict, but may interpret 
existing evidence in a benign fashion. They might choose to 
discount information against the defendant (Kelley, 1972).
The results of the experiment are consistent with this 
model. Jurors receiving the auto theft-hit and run crime 
gave higher ratings on "importance of having the perpetrator 
caught" and "anger at the crime." Apparently, the Type II 
error of acquitting a guilty suspect would be higher in this 
condition.
Secondly, there is support for the supposition that 
jurors can interpret information in a way more unfavorable 
to the defendant with a more severe crime. Ratings on "like­
lihood of guilt" indicated that jurors across conditions did 
draw different conclusions from the evidence. Open ended 
responses indicated that information was interpreted differ­
ently across conditions with comments in the severe crime 
condition being more unfavorable to the defendant. The dis­
tortion of information can be further illustrated with
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mediating variables assessing emotional reactions toward the 
defendant. These reactions were more negative in the severe 
crime condition even though there was little personal informa­
tion about the defendant to base them on. The higher corre­
lations between these mediating variables and verdict in the 
severe crime condition indicated that ratings across these 
dimensions were indeed consistent. The leeway in evidence 
interpretation can also be seen by examining open ended state­
ments as a function of verdict. Most jurors interpreted all 
information in a fashion remarkably congruent to the verdict 
they had reached.
Finally, path analysis showed some support for the 
present model. While the low correlation between Type II 
error orientation and verdict makes conclusions tentative, 
the three measured components fit the predicted model well.
The relationship between Type II error orientation and verdict 
was strongly mediated by emotional evaluation of the defen­
dant. Furthermore, as would be expected, convicting jurors 
in the severe crime condition most strongly exhibited this 
pattern. In future research, assessment of more concrete 
information such as trial evidence, is expected to have a 
similar mediating effect.
The present interpretation may be able to incorporate 
and strengthen previous theory. While effect and consistency 
processes can influence verdict, the Type I-Type II error 
orientation concept may be able to explain how and when these 
factors work. Details with affective value such as
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negativeness of the crime, likeability of the defendant and 
seriousness of the sentence may all influence the Type I- 
Type II error orientation value. Knowledge of this value 
may allow a better understanding of how jurors process and 
distort evidence. Consistency seeking, for example, may be 
one process causing information distortion which becomes 
more predictable. Jurors oriented toward avoiding Type II 
errors will obtain consistency by minimizing information in 
the defendant's favor, while those seeking to avoid Type I 
errors will minimize information against the defendant.
Because distortion becomes a predictable process, information 
integration models which consider the present viewpoint may 
more successfully predict a greater variety of trial outcomes.
The present research suggests a model of juridic 
decision making. However, further research is needed to veri­
fy the model and apply it to a variety of courtroom situations. 
The effects of Type I-Type II errors on information processing 
and emotional reactions toward the defendant must be further 
examined. Perhaps a clearer operationalization of Type I- 
Type II error orientation may allow a better quantification 
of the concept. Instead of two cases, correlations between 
Type I-Type II error orientation value, information interpre­
tation and emotional reactions should be assessed across a 
number of cases or variations of a case. The effects of 
Type I-Type II error orientation on verdict have been demon­
strated in present and previous (e.g., Kerr, 1978) research. 
Future studies should examine the mediating effects of
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information distortion and emotional reactions on verdict. 
Similarly, reactions to the defendant should be further tested 
as mediating variables.
The various relationships suggested in the present 
model are open to empirical investigation. Perhaps when bet­
ter established, a Type I-Type II error orientation model can 
systematically explain how jurors respond to the complexity 
of information present in the trial situation.
APPENDIX 1A 
Case Stimuli for Severe Crime,
Incriminating Evidence Condition
Psychology and the Lav;— Juridic Decision Making
One of the basic principles of American democracy is 
that any individual accused on a crime has the right to fair 
and equitable judgement by peers. This study, a joint effort 
of lawyers and psychologists seeks to better understand juror 
decision making by testing how a number of subjects react to 
a case.
Your role in this study is to be a juror. After read­
ing a case, abbreviated to only present essential information, 
you will be given scales assessing your verdict in the case 
and various other reactions. Read the case and answer the 




Case #14 New York v. Wilson 
Case Description
At 7:30 on the morning of January 19,1977, a Buick 
Skylark was stolen. The car had been parked on North Broad­
way at the corner of Lake Avenue, a busy intersection in 
Yonkers, New York. The owner had left the keys in the igni­
tion of the car. Upon driving away, the perpetrator struck 
Mrs. Robertson and her daughter who were crossing the street. 
The mother was killed instantly and the daughter subsequently 
paralyzed from the waist down.
A witness saw the crime and was able to give a descrip­
tion of the perpetrator. At 9:30 a.m., the stolen car was 
discovered near a bus stop on 124th street and 7th avenue in 
New York City. The passenger side was badly damaged and the 
headlight on that side was smashed. Later reports confirmed 
that the car had struck and glanced off a vehicle on the side 
of the road.
A suspect fitting the description given by the witness 
was picked up by police near the abandoned vehicle. The 
police read him his rights, then transferred him to Yonkers 
where he was booked for hit and run driving and grand larceny 
auto theft.
A grand jury indicted the suspect on April 24, 1977.
The defendant refused to plea bargain and trial was conducted 
in Westchester County Court in White Plains on July 24, 1977. 
Below are brief edited transcripts of the case.
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Case Transcript
prosecuting attorney: the state will prove that the accused, 
Andre Wilson, was present at the scene of the crime, that he 
stole a vehicle registered to Mr. Marchioni, that he will­
fully steered the vehicle at two innocent bystanders and po­
tential witnesses— resulting in the death of one and permanent 
paralysis of the other, and that he then abandoned the vehicle 
fifteen miles from the scene of the crime.
defense attorney: the defense will show that the state fails 
to positively identify the accused as perpetrator of the 
crime. Obvious reason exists for this failure: the defendent 
did not commit the crime. A number of passersby could be 
found with appearance and dress meeting the description given 
of the offender and any could have stolen the car. Mr.
Wilson was an innocent bystander accused of a crime due to 
the circumstantial evidence of being found by the police in 
the wrong place at the wrong time.
judge: prosecutor, call to the stand your first witness.
(note that all testimony in this case was eyewitness report­
ing. Fingerprints were not available; the crime occurred 
on a cold January morning and it was possible given the 
temperature that the criminal wore gloves. No other 
identifying evidence was found.)
prosecutor: Mrs. Mikkelson, please take the stand. Mrs. 
Mikkelson, you claim that you observed the crime occur on the
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morning of January 19th. Could you describe what happened?
Mrs. Mikkelson; well— yes. I saw a Black man run to Mr. 
Marchioni's car.
prosecutor: so, you know Mr. Marchioni?
Mrs. Mikkelson: not that well, but I assume from the trial 
that his car is the one we are talking about.
prosecutor: please continue.
Mrs. Mikkelson: Well... This man flung the car door open and 
practically dove in. Anyone could spot right away that some­
thing funny was going on. All of a sudden he stepped on the 
gas and took off. Then this woman was crossing the street 
with her little girl. She was watching the man take off in 
the car. He seemed to notice this and turned the car (sobbing).
prosecutor: yes, Mrs. Mikkelson?
Mrs. Mikkelson: and he turned the car right at them— hitting 
both of them.
prosecutor: did you pay close attention to the crime?
Mrs. Mikkelson: yes, because it was obvious that the car was 
being stolen.
prosecutor: why were you out at 7:30 in the morning?
Mrs. Mikkelson: I babysit for the Kleins down the block. Mr.
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Klein usually leaves for work at about 7:15. The Mrs. works 
down the street at Otis elevator. She leaves at about 8:00, 
but I come over to chat with her.
prosecutor: how close were you to the crime?
Mrs. Mikkelson: well, when the man first ran to the car, I
was pretty close, but I got closer as he got in the car. I
didn't think he saw me, but I saw him.
prosecutor: so you were maybe 15 feet away when he committed 
the crime.
defense: I object your honor; prosecution is leading the wit­
ness.
judge: sustained.
prosecutor: how far were you from the crime?
Mrs. Mikkelson: maybe as far as from here to those steps
(points to courtroom steps about 25 feet away).
prosecutor: Is the man you saw present, in this courtroom?
Mrs. Mikkelson: he (points to the defendant) looks like the one.
prosecutor: you were able to pick the suspect out of a police 
lineup of fifteen suspects having similar appearance. You 
must be pretty sure of your opinion.
Mrs. Mikkelson: well, I saw his face from a distance but still
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don't think I could ever forget what he looked like. 
prosecutor: the prosecution rests its case, 
judge: defense may cross examine.
defense attorney: Mrs. Mikkelson, are you certain of the 
identity of the suspect?
Mrs. Mikkelson: I did get a good look at him. 
defense: about how long a look?
Mrs. Mikkelson: maybe three seconds or so.
defense: and from a three second glance at 25 feet away, you 
feel confident that you can positively identify the defendant.
Mrs. Mikkelson: that was the man I saw.
defense: are you sure?
Mrs. Mikkelson: well, I can't describe every feature on his 
face; who could in my shoes? But something about his appear­
ance stands out in my mind.
defense: seems like you are fairly uncertain, Mrs. Mikkelson.
(objections follow and are sustained) 
defense: no further questions.
prosecutor: The prosecution calls Officer Rashevsky to the 
stand.
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prosecutor; Officer Rashevsky, you and your partner arrested 
the suspect for suspicion of the crime in question on 
January 19. Is that correct?
Rashevsky; yes sir.
prosecutor: how did you become involved in the case?
Officer Rashevsky: we were patrolling our beat and saw a car 
that appeared to have been in an accident. We radioed in the 
license number and headquarters informed us that the car had 
been reported stolen. They gave us a description of the sus­
pect.
prosecutor: and did you find a suspect meeting the description 
near the abandoned vehicle?
Rashevsky: yes sir.
prosecutor: is that man present in court today?
Rashevsky: yes sir, him (pointing to the defendant).
prosecutor: no further questions. 
judge: the defense may cross examine.
defense: Officer Rashevsky, what was the nature of the descrip­
tion you used to arrest the suspect?
Officer Rashevsky: Black man, young, wearing jeans and a heavy 
coat, average height, small build, wearing a brown scarf and 
ski hat.
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defense: you arrested the man in a heavily Black neighbor­
hood. He was wearing nothing that unusual. Couldn't a 
number of other suspects have met this description?
Rashevsky: It's possible. But this suspect was the only man 
in the general vicinity of the crime who came close to meeting 
the description. He looked suspicious and acted apprehen­
sively when we approached him.
defense: and we are supposed to convict a man on your intui­
tion. Just how far was the suspect from the car when you 
arrested him?
Rashevsky: about four blocks. 
defense: no further questions.
Note that the defendant lived alone in Yonkers near 
the scene of the crime. No other witnesses were available 
for either the prosecution or the defense.
The defendant was placed on the stand and denied 
responsibility for the crime. He claimed to have been on 
his way to visit friends when picked up by the police. As 
he had not yet met with anyone there were no others to con­
firm his alibi.
Turn to scales on next page.
APPENDIX IB 
Mild Condition Manipulation
Case #14 New York v. Wilson
Case Description
At 7:30 on the morning of January 19, 1977, a Buick 
Skylark was stolen. The car had been parked on North Broad­
way at the corner of Lake Avenue, a busy intersection in 
Yonkers, New York. The owner had left the keys in the igni­
tion of the car.
A witness saw the crime and was able to give a descrip­
tion of the perpetrator. At 9:30 a.m., the stolen car was 
discovered near a bus stop on 124th street and 7th avenue in 
New York City. The passenger side was badly damaged and the 
headlight on that side was smashed. Later reports confirmed 
that the car had struck and glanced off a vehicle on the side 
of the road.
A suspect fitting the description given by the witness 
was picked up by police near the abandoned vehicle. The 
police read him his rights, then transferred him to Yonkers 
where he was booked for grand larceny auto theft.
A grand jury indicted the suspect on April 24, 1977.
The defendant refused to plea bargain and trial was conducted 
in Westchester County Court in White Plains on July 24, 1977. 




prosecuting attorney: the state will prove that the accused, 
Andre Wilson, was present at the scene of the crime, that he 
willfully stole a vehicle registered to Mr. Marchioni and 
that he then damaged and abandoned the vehicle fifteen miles 
from the scene of the crime.
defense attorney: the defense will show that the state fails
to positively identify the accused as perpetrator of the crime. 
Obvious reason exists for this failure; the defendent did not 
commit the crime. A number of passersby could be found with 
appearance and dress meeting the description given of the 
offender and any could have stolen the car. Mr. Wilson was
an innocent bystander accused of a crime due to the circum­
stantial evidence of being found by the police in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.
judge: prosecutor, call to the stand your first witness.
(note that all testimony in this case was eyewitness re­
porting. Fingerprints were not available; the crime 
occurred on a cold January morning and it was possible 
given the temperature that the criminal wore gloves.
No other identifying evidence was found.)
prosecutor: Mrs. Mikkelson please take the stand. Mrs. 
Mikkelson, you claim that you observed the crime occur on the 
morning of January 19. Could you describe what happened?
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Mrs. Mikkelson: well— yes. I saw a Black man run to Mr. 
Marchioni's car.
prosecutor: so, you know Mr. Marchioni?
Mrs. Mikkelson: not that well, but I assume from the trial 
that his car is the one we are talking about.
prosecutor: please continue.
Mrs. Mikkelson: Well... This man flung the car door open and 
practically dove in. Anyone could spot right away that some­
thing funny was going on. All of a sudden he stepped on the 
gas and took off. He had enough room to pull out of the 
space quickly. Lucky no one was coming the other way—
prosecutor: yes, Mrs. Mikkelson.
Mrs. Mikkelson: he went right through a red light.
prosecutor: did you pay close attention to the crime?
Mrs. Mikkelson: yes, because it was obvious that the car was 
being stolen.
prosecutor: why were you out at 7:30 in the morning?
Mrs. Mikkelson: I babysit for the Kleins down the block. Mr. 
Klein usually leaves for work at about 7:15. The Mrs. works 
down the street at Otis elevator. She leaves at about 8:00, 
but I come over to chat with her.
APPENDIX 1C
Nonincriminating Eyewitness Testimony Manipulation 
((Insert into page 63 of Appendix 1A)) 
judge: defense may cross examine.
defense attorney; Mrs. Mikkelson, are you certain as to the 
identity of the suspect?
Mrs. Mikkelson: I did get a good look at him.
defense attorney: about how long a look?
Mrs. Mikkelson: maybe three seconds or so.
defense: and from a three second glance at about 25 feet
away you feel confident that you can positively identify
the defendant?
Mrs. Mikkelson: that man seems like the one I saw. 
defense: are you sure?
Mrs. Mikkelson; well, I can't describe every feature on his 
face; who could in my shoes? But something about his appear­
ance stands out in my mind.
defense: then why were you not able to identify the defendant 
in a police lineup?
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Mrs. Mikkelson; They dressed them up to look so much alike. 
But when the defendant is alone like this, I can tell.
defense: what if an imposter were here today in court? 
Could you tell that he was not the suspect?




Note that the defendant lived alone in New York City. 
No other witnesses were available for either the prosecution 
, or the defense.
The defendant was placed on the stand and denied 
responsibility for the crime. He claimed to have been on 
his way to visit friends when picked up by the police. As 
he had not yet met with anyone, there were no others to 
confirm his alibi.




1) Circle either A or B. Did you find the defendent innocent 
or guilty of committing the crime?
A) innocent B) guilty
2) Circle a number indicating your judgement of the defendant's 
degree of guilt.
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
absolutely absolutely
not guilty guilty
3) Describe your emotional reaction to the defendant using the 
following scales:
a) How angry did you feel toward the defendent?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
not at all extremely
angry angry
b) How much sympathy did you feel for the defendent?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
no sympathy a great deal
at all of sympathy
c) How threatening did you find the defendant?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
not at all extremely
threatening threatening
d) How suspicious were you of the defendant?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10




e) How much did you personally dislike the defendant?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
did not disliked him
dislike him strongly
at all
4) How important do you think it is to have the perpetrator 
of this crime caught and prosecuted?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
not at all extremely
important important
5) How angry does a crime of this nature make you?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
not at all extremely
angry angry
6) How likely do you think it was that the defendant committed 
the crime?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
not at all extremely
likely likely
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7) Please assign a whole 
number to represent the 
seriousness of the crime 
you have read about.
To the right is a table 
giving you a list of 
crimes with their 
seriousness ratings 
(assigned by a large 
sample of people across 
the country). Select 
a seriousness rating 
by judging where the 
present crime would fit 
on this table.











-possession of heroin 
-$1000 larceny
-tax evasion ($10,000) 
-$10,000 theft









. , . , ness-attempted rape
-armed robbery
50-------- rape - no injury
■rape - hospitalization 
needed
65
-------- bombing resulting in
70 death







8) How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following 
reasons for sending the perpetrator of this crime to jail?
a) to isolate him from society
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
b) to discourage others from committing the same crime 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
c) to discourage the offender from doing it again
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
d) to rehabilitate the offender
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
e) to punish the offender
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
f) no reason exists for putting a person in jail
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
9) The following questions pertain to Mrs. Mikkelson, the first 
witness.
a) Was Mrs. Mikkelson able to pick the defendant out 
of a police lineup?
A) yes B) no
b) To what extent did you believe her testimony?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6. 7 8 9 10
not at all a great deal
c) How important was her testimony in helping you reach 
a verdict?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
not at all extremely
important important
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10) The following questions pertain to the location of the 
crime.
a) Where did the defendant reside? (write in answer) -
b) Where (what city) was the car stolen? -
c) In what way did the defendant's place of residence 
influence the likelihood that he committed the crime?
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
it made it made
it much it much
less likely more likely
11) In the space provided below please indicate specifically 
and in detail the reason for your verdict and explain what 
factors tended to lead you to see the defendant as more 
innocent or guilty.
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